As a pilot on the shadow tanker

As a pilot on the shadow tanker

By Dr. Kyle Muller

Every day, oil tankers of the so -called Russian shadow fleet drive past the German coast. Nobody gets what is going on on the shadow tank – with one exception.

“I feel like part of the Russian war machine,” says Bjarne Cรฆsar Skinnerup. The experienced Danish Seelotse actually wants to achieve something completely different with his work: that Danish and German coasts are protected from ship accidents and their consequences.

His layers begin on an orange pilot boat, which brings him out of the Danish mainland to the Baltic Sea, in the Fehmarnbelt or the big Belt. In full speed, the boat goes alongside large merchant ships. Skinnerup has to climb a knitting ladder on the side wall. The crew receives him at the top and takes it to the command bridge.

It doesn’t matter where the ships come from and what they transport. And so it happens that Skinerrup even climbs on oil tankers to which after a joint research of NDR And nobody in the European Union or other western states gets an insight into the Danish medium of Danwatch: ships of the so -called Russian shadow fleet, which are presumably – presumably sanctioned – to transport all over the world. The accompaniment by the pilots is not a duty in the Danish transit routes; However, since the sea passages are narrow, shallow and busy, most ships take advantage of the help.

Doubts about the qualification of the crews

“I know: Everything that is exported from Russian ports – the money that is earned – so that Russia finances his war against Ukraine,” says the pilot. “That’s why I do my work with very mixed feelings. And to be honest, that’s really sad.”

But not only the conscience of the conscience drives him up, but also what he experiences on board the shadow tanker. On the one hand there is the age of these ships. Until a few years ago, no tankers appeared in the Baltic Sea that are older than 20 years, said Skinnerup. Larger oil companies follow up NDR-Information no more tankers that are older than 18 years. Now this happens every day, as can be seen in ship trackers like Marine Traffic.

The pilot criticizes the technical and hygienic conditions on board. The crews are also “not so qualified” to understand why they cannot cross the waters as they think “. Sometimes it is “really as if they don’t care”, Skinnerup continued. “And sometimes when I leave, I wonder: How to make it to your goal?”

So far, no one can stop the allegedly dangerous tanker. According to the UN Sea law agreement, no state may stop a ship off its coast, which is in “peaceful passage”. And so state actors such as the German marine can only observe the ships.

Accompanied by shadow anchors of Russian warships

In April accompanied a NDR-Team a German Naval Association, which takes part in an international maneuver in front of the Danish island of Bornholm – in a sea area in which tankers of the shadow fleet run daily. It is about supporting the NATO operation “Baltic Sentry” against the shadow fleet, if only by recognizable presence. In the past, there have always been cases in which shadow ships were associated with sabotage files in the Baltic Sea.

The maneuver is commanded by the “Mosel” staff ship. A announcement on board when the day is broken: the deck is blocked. Shadowers and Russian warships are nearby. The crew on board the “Moselle” observes a companion from a shadow anchor, a freighter and two Russian corvettes.

The German soldiers found that weapons were apparently ready for use on the Russian warships, said German commander Mario. Soldiers were on a platform next to the command bridges of the ships, the so -called cams. “There are also machine guns that seem to be occupied,” said frigate captain. Later the German coast guard and the Danish marine will guide the convoy ship past the German coast.

Fighter plane protects shadow tanker from Estonia

The fact that such encounters can also escalate was shown in mid -May off the Estonia coast. The Estonian coast guard drives up to a shadow tanker; Apparently to control it. Thereupon Russia – presumably for deterrent – sends a fighter jet. According to Estonian information, he penetrates the airspace of the Baltic State. Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna later confirms the incident and speaks of a “very serious” situation on the Baltic Sea.

One of the most renowned analysts of sanctions against Russia is Robin Brooks, Senior Fellow of the American think tank in Brooking’s institution. The shadow fleet had been built up in response to western countermeasures after the beginning of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The G7 countries – Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom and the USA – had imposed an oil price lid. Russia should still be able to export its oil, but only at a price determined by the West. Since then, legal tankers have threatened consequences if they transport Russian crude oil at the market price. This threatened Russia’s purchasing power, says Brooks. “The whole Russian economy could have collapsed,” he says.

In response to be independent of the legal market, Russia built the shadow fleet. Old ships in particular had been bought, which would otherwise have been allegedly scrapped. Anyone who runs the ships is apparently veiled in order to offer western sanctions as little attack as possible. How many shadow tankers there are today is unclear. The Ukrainian Think Tank Kyiv School of Economics belongs to about 650 ships to the Russian shadow fleet.

Up to $ 40 million a year?

How lucrative the operation of ships of the shadow fleet is revealed, reported this NDR Now an anonymous insider from shipping circles that does not want to see his name published. With a single ship, $ 30 to $ 40 million could be earned in the Russian oil trade in just one year. The used oil tankers would be considered “rust buckets” in the industry and, in his opinion, cost the owners about twelve million dollars when buying. Most of them saw in the Middle East, India or in other South Asian countries.

“As a rule, every owner only has one ship. So they try to avoid sanctions,” continued the insider. As a result, the damage is limited when a ship recognized, sanctioned and therefore unusable. So far, the EU has placed 342 shadow tankers on its sanction list.

The western countermeasures against individual ships of the shadow fleet are effective to an analysis of economist Robin Brooks. He looked at whether oil tankers continue to transport Russian oil when they were sanctioned by the EU or through the USA. And in fact that is not the case: the activity breaks together. However, Brooks does not see that the sanctions are therefore a success: “We have the means, we know exactly what we should have done, but we didn’t do it.” After more than three years of war against Ukraine, the sanctions would be too hesitantly imposed.

EU votes About sanctions “inefficient”

According to a calculation of the Kyiv School of Economics Institute, Russia, despite the western countermeasures, was able to earn more than $ 230 billion with the export of oil and gas last year alone. The Commission of the European Union now wants to reduce the Russian income through further sanctions and launched the guidelines for an 18th sanction package on June 11th. Among other things, it is about further sanctions against tankers of the shadow fleet. The package must adopt the member states – but their consent is anything but certain.

The Foreign Minister of Latvia, Baiba Braลพe, told that NDRyour country is to sanction more shadow tankers, but the coordination among the members is “not very efficient”. Evidence would have to be presented for each individual ship. In a vote, it must then be unanimously decided to put it on the EU sanction list.

Kyle Muller
About the author
Dr. Kyle Muller
Dr. Kyle Mueller is a Research Analyst at the Harris County Juvenile Probation Department in Houston, Texas. He earned his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Texas State University in 2019, where his dissertation was supervised by Dr. Scott Bowman. Dr. Mueller's research focuses on juvenile justice policies and evidence-based interventions aimed at reducing recidivism among youth offenders. His work has been instrumental in shaping data-driven strategies within the juvenile justice system, emphasizing rehabilitation and community engagement.
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