In the early stages of the Ebola epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the virus escaped detection partly due to aid cuts.
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The analysis of telephone data and, with them, of the movements of the population of the Democratic Republic of Congo last spring reconstructs the first stages of the covert spread of the Ebola Bundibugyo virus.
The strain of the pathogen that has been raging in the African country for six months, and which also briefly affected Kenya and Nigeria, has caused at least 10,668 confirmed cases, including 5,198 deaths, in 67 health areas of 8 provinces. About half (48.7%) of infected people die, reflecting the difficulty in identifying cases early and administering timely treatment.
It has long been suspected that the first case of the ongoing Ebola epidemic, reported by the health authorities on May 15, 2026, was merely the tip of the iceberg of a situation that had been simmering for weeks. A new study published in Science used information on citizens’ mobility to dig into those first links in the diffusion chain and return a discouraging answer: if there had been more health resources in the area, perhaps the spread of the virus could have slowed down sooner.
The first symptoms already appeared in April
According to the authors of the study, 42 international researchers led by Dav M. Ebengo, from the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo), the first Ebola positive patient began showing symptoms on April 25, 2026. Another suspected case was tested on April 9, but the test gave a null result.
By comparing anonymized cellphone data with detailed data on early cases, scientists found that human movement was a major contributor to Ebola’s early expansion, particularly between May 10 and June 1, a period in which the number of zones and health areas reporting positive cases increased very rapidly.
Movements of people from the towns of Mongbwalu, Bunia and Rwampara (in Ituri province) between April 24 and May 24 helped predict which health zones would report infections by June 1. Areas close to the initial outbreaks presented a greater risk of infections, but locations 150-200 km away from the initial centers scattered along well-traveled routes to larger cities or countries were also important centers of contagion.
An unusual strain in a weakened territory
The stark conclusion of the study is that surveillance systems failed to promptly detect signs of a possible Ebola outbreak, for two main reasons. The first concerns the lesser-known strain, Ebola Bundibugyo: a subtype of Ebola different from the Zaire strain that has caused most of the major Ebola epidemics in Africa.
While diagnostic tests are widely available for Ebola Zaire (as well as two types of vaccines and therapies based on monoclonal antibodies), no approved vaccines are yet available against Ebola Bundibugyo (there are currently two candidate vaccines), and in the province of Ituri there were no tests: only the large regional health facilities had them. This is also why the virus escaped the first possible identifications.
The second reason is the defunding of community health programs due to Trump’s cuts to USAID foreign aid. This shortage of resources has influenced the lack of surveillance in the area, the first point in which critical issues, unusual symptoms and suspicious cases usually emerge.
